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Training the Imagination to go Visiting 
Jean Barr and Morwenna Griffiths 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Jon Nixon’s article, ‘Learning the Language of Deliberative Democracy’ explored 
languages of hope in relation to the discourses of deliberative democracy. Ours continues 
this theme of finding languages of hope. Like his article, ours makes people central. It 
explores a neglected area of epistemology: knowing people. It suggests that we take a 
critical perspective on the metaphors we live and then re-configure them to think again 
about the public and private spaces in the universities where we work.  
 
This chapter explores, in the context of university education, the nature of a public space 
that can accommodate and reconstruct ‘public knowledge’. We understand ‘public space’ 
to be a social space of interaction, rather than a location in physical or cyber space 
(though it may be that too). We understand ‘public knowledge’ to be that knowledge 
which is articulated and/or expressed by all, including those people who are routinely 
excluded from traditional public spaces. People require public spaces in which they can 
discover, construct, develop and reinterpret knowledge of various kinds, and, in some 
cases, use the knowledge to help resolve practical problems they face. The nature of these 
spaces is changing as society (including its schools and universities) evolves. We point 
out that the traditional theoretical frameworks of political philosophy are unable to deal 
with the complexity of social space in today’s society. They depend heavily on the notion 
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of the public ‘forum’ (or sphere), that is a space available to all citizens - accessible to 
them and usable by them. This notion is inadequate even within the limited context of 
Higher Education and its communities. 
 
In criticising traditional frameworks we draw on feminist and other writings which move 
on from critique to the more positive project of reconstructing knowledge and pedagogy. 
We use real examples not just as illustrations of our argument but as concrete 
embodiments of our case and in order to encourage less confining frameworks, processes 
and metaphors for organising our work in higher education. The examples are drawn 
from our own experiences. They are offered both as reasons for hope and as aids to the 
imagination. They point, too, towards greater risk-taking than is encouraged in the 
current atmosphere of university teaching and research.    
 
II PUBLIC SPACES AND THEIR USES 
 
The story is told again and again, for example, by Jurgen Habermas, of a public sphere 
gained (by the liberal bourgeoisie of the 19th century) and lost (in the age of 
consumerism, the mass media and the intrusion of the state into the intimacy of the 
family); it is re-iterated by Sennet, about cities, in The Fall of Public Man and critiqued 
by Robbins in The Phantom Public Sphere (see Habermas 1962, recently translated; 
Sennet 1974; Robbins 1993). The question we must ask of course is: for whom was the 
social entity of the ‘city’ once more public than now? Was it ever open to scrutiny and 
participation by the majority? 
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If so, where were the workers, the women, gays, Black people? Rosalyn Deutsche 
believes that those who most lament the loss of the public sphere (conceived as unitary) 
may be suffering from a form of agoraphobia, panicking at the openness of a truly 
democratic public sphere, requiring a security blanket against uncertainty (Deutsche 
1996: 327). 
 
The rise and fall of the educated public says MacIntyre, coincided with the rise and fall of 
the philosophy of common sense as taught in the universities (MacIntyre 1987). 
MacIntyre acknowledges that this public was very exclusive (and it certainly was – of the 
working class, women, Catholics - anyone, it would seem, whose ability to reason in the 
required disinterested, from first principles way could not be guaranteed). He is referring 
specifically to the Scottish Enlightenment but the point can be made more generally, 
although any particular ‘educated public’ will work its own exclusions: Protestants, 
perhaps, or Jews, or Arabs, or gays. Despite this acknowledgement, MacIntyre still 
argues:  
It is only through the discipline of having one’s claims tested in ongoing debate, 
in the light of standards on the rational justification of which, and on the rational 
justification afforded by which, the participants in debate are able to agree, that 
the reasoning of any particular individual is rescued from the vagaries of passion 
and interest (MacIntyre 1987: 24). 
 
One is tempted to ask who would want to be a member of such a bloodless and exclusive 
club of rational, ascetic, Christian Scotsmen who can write such sentences. Certainly, any 
small community such as this, sharing a common culture and sense of purpose could of 
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course believe in its own universal character and disinterestedness (‘the power of the best 
argument’). But surely we cannot. 1
 
The bourgeois notion of the public sphere which has been outlined by Jurgen Habermas 
on numerous occasions requires bracketing inequalities of status, proceeding in 
deliberation and discussion as if they do not exist. Yet, to proceed in this way – as if 
inequalities between the participants does not exist – is unlikely to foster participatory 
parity; on the contrary, it is much more likely that such ‘bracketing’ (which is how most 
seminars proceed in universities) will work to advantage dominant groups and to 
disadvantage subordinates. It is hard to imagine any possible participatory parity between 
the Home Office, the tabloid press and asylum seekers already in Britain, let alone any 
would be refugees, facing danger in their own countries. Even for refugees with a 
university education, fluency in English, and the help of lawyers, parity must remain a 
chimera, logically as well as in fact2, because the Home Office and the tabloid press are 
                                                 
1 Related to this, David Noble has written a fascinating account of how the advent of ascetic culture among 
Christian clerics from the late medieval period ‘has led to male dominance over the practices and 
institutions of higher learning’ and continues to exert a ‘subtle influence’ even today (see Noble 1992: back 
cover). He shows, through painstaking historical research, [insisting that ‘the history of ideas is not the 
same as the history of people’ (Noble 1992: 3)] that the usual story of Western science (told in ‘secular 
retrospect’) as in opposition to religion, as, that is, a dramatic departure from clerical (Catholic and 
Protestant) tradition and authority, is simply wrong, and ahistorical. ‘Western science evolved only half 
human, in a world without women’ is the dramatic opening sentence of his book, which is at pains to 
underline the strangeness of the resulting state of affairs, whilst coming to appear so normal. He contests, 
too, the common assumption that women have always been excluded : 
‘an assumption that rests on the allegedly enduring legacy of ancient Greece, with its homosocial 
Platonic academies and Aristotelian misogyny’ (pxv) 
And he provides an account of anticlerical social struggle as a corrective to this common ahistorical 
assumption of continuity, as well as to the fatalism it engenders. In his final chapter he describes women’s 
permanent entry, in the 19th century, into what was by then a world without women,  
‘only to be confronted by another clerical restoration, in the form of a male scientific 
professionalism that betrayed the same misogynistic and, indeed, monastic habits of the clerical 
culture it superceded’ (xvi). 
2 The argument is sharply made in Stephen Friar’s 2003 film Dirty Pretty Things. A line summarising the 
anger behind the film is delivered by an actor playing just such a refugee, a Nigerian doctor, who had 
worked in the USA, to an English van driver: ‘You did not notice us because you do not see us. We are 
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institutions that are set up precisely to work as powerful interest groups, not as reasonable 
individuals.3 As Iris Young insists: ‘The ideal of the civic public as expressing the 
general interest, the impartial point of view of reason, itself results in exclusion’.  
Specifically:  
‘By assuming that reason stands opposed to desire, affectivity and the body, the civic 
public must exclude bodily and affective aspects of human existence’ (Young 1987: 59-
66).  
 
Similarly, as Nancy Fraser has suggested, unequally empowered social groups develop 
unequally valued cultural styles, and the workings of political economy reinforces this 
imbalance by denying to them equal access to the material means of equal participation, 
including education (Fraser 1993). We agree. Consider, we would add, the continuing 
impact of the Bantu Education Act, in South Africa. More than 10 years after apartheid 
ended Black South Africans are less able to access their legal rights to education than 
their White compatriots (McGregor 2003). Consider how few working class women 
contribute to ‘public’ debates on Higher Education policy (Morley and Walsh 1995; 
Leonard 2002). 
 
Some feminists have made stronger claims. They have scrutinised the notion of reason as 
impartiality and detachment which holds sway in education and which reappears in many 
theorists of democracy, including Habermas. According to Habermas, the force of the 
better argument is what wins in his rational ‘ideal speech situation’. Iris Young contests 
                                                                                                                                                 
ones who clean your rooms, drive your taxis and suck your cocks.’ The line is as it has been remembered 
and may not quite accurate. 
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this on the grounds that what counts as acceptable reasons, good grounds and so on, must 
be understood as itself contestable. Further, according to Young, a model of democratic 
education based on discussion though important, is limited; we need, in her view, a more 
open notion of communication than mere deliberation, one which does not exclude 
emotions as beyond the pale, for example, and one which assumes a starting point of 
distance and difference (even conflict and struggle) rather than togetherness and 
sameness (Young 1990). This draws attention to the fact that efforts to make the world a 
more just place depend a lot on developing people’s capacity to relate to others as well as 
on refining people’s capacity to discern rational principles of argument and to abide by a 
particular set of ground rules when engaging in it.4
 
III WHAT KIND OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION? 
 
If traditional models of discussion are inadequate, what can be put in their place? The 
writing of Hannah Arendt on the nature of political life is suggestive here.  
 
Hannah Arendt believes that plurality and conflict are conditions of public life. Arendt’s 
notion of plurality does not denote incommensurable differences, only their irreducibility 
to a common measure or standard. She proposes storytelling as an alternative way of 
constructing knowledge and as a way of engaging people in a kind of critical thinking 
which is different from an argument. According to Arendt, what is normally intended by 
the notion of critical thinking (impartial, detached) fails when it comes to seeking to 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 There is more detail about more about this systematic lack of parity in Griffiths (2000).  
4 See Gaita (2002), which locates the roots of our capacity for justice and virtue in love and intimacy.  
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understand unprecedented events because such events bring to light the ‘ruin of our 
categories and standards of judgement’. Such events demand, in her memorable phrase, 
‘thinking without a banister’. They demand explicitly judgmental storytelling, aimed at 
teaching the kind of critical understanding which Martha Nussbaum has described as 
consisting in ‘the keen responsiveness of intellect, imagination and feeling to the 
particularity of a situation’ (Nussbaum 1986: 191). 
 
Thus, in The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt writes about totalitarianism in such a 
way as to move her audience to engage with her in thinking ‘what we are doing’ (Disch 
1996: 140). In Arendt’s view of critical thinking philosophy takes second place to poetry. 
This is because, for her, it is not abstraction but considered attention to particularity that 
accounts for ‘enlarged thought’. Being critical, for Arendt, does not call for disinterest, 
detachment or withdrawal from political commitment. Instead, it requires ‘training the 
imagination to go visiting’ and this is done by means of stories. By storytelling, she asks, 
‘how would you see the world if you saw it from my position?’ The reader or ‘visitor’ is 
offered a bridge and invited not merely to assimilate different perspectives but to 
converse with them and to consider how they differ from their own. Deliberate 
‘distancing’, making the familiar strange, is also required for critical thought, believes 
Arendt. By means of taking the imagination visiting I am both distanced from the 
familiar and taken to unfamiliar standpoints. Serious heartfelt differences remain even 
where they do not preclude a useful degree of mutual understanding. Similarly, Cockburn 
draws on a careful analysis of her observations of women’s peace groups working across 
difference, to articulate ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ as key concepts in developing 
understandings across difference. The groups she studied were located in places where 
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identity and difference ‘is a killing matter’ (Cockburn 1998; Cockburn and Hunter 1999): 
Belfast, Bosnia and Israel/Palestine. Yet the women were able to construct enough 
mutual understanding and common ground to work with each other on the practical 
problems that faced them. Each woman stayed ‘rooted’ in her own position, while 
‘shifting’ towards other women in the dialogue by recognising their specific positionings, 
and her own unfinished knowledge about them.   
 
The recommendation to ‘train the imagination to go visiting’ is offered as a social model 
of rationality which involves a commitment to disputation. It is suggestive for those 
interested in a reconstituted higher education. Where her imagination takes her is to a 
place where conflict is ubiquitous, where actors are explicitly partisan and where what is 
involved is ‘taking sides for the world’s sake’ (Arendt 1968: 8). 
 
According to Arendt, ‘civic mindedness’ can too often be a façade which suppresses 
dissent; for her, it is the spaces people inhabit together as citizens which unite them in a 
political community; it is not a set of common values: ‘We call this reality the “web” of 
human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality’. And, 
‘for all its intangibility , this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly 
have in common’ (Arendt 1958: 183). It is the ‘space between’ them which they share, 
not some quality in them or some common beliefs which unites people.  
 
                                                 
5 This section about Cockburn has been drafted from memory and may need to be adjusted when the text is 
to hand.. 
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Undoubtedly, plurality is the political principle par excellence for Arendt: people bring 
together their interests, and points of view and these are tested, influenced and expanded 
but not thereby transformed into unanimous agreement. Similarly, Iris MarionYoung 
proposes a notion of ‘differentiated solidarity’. She explains: ‘Most uses of the term 
‘solidarity’ assume some sort of fellow feeling or mutual identification, as do its 
synonyms, such a ‘community’. (Young 2000: 222). However, in our complex and plural 
societies, she maintains, ideals of inclusion ‘must rely on a concept of mutual respect and 
caring that presumes distance: that norms of solidarity hold among strangers and those 
who in many ways remain strange to one another’ (our italics). The basis of such 
solidarity is quite simply that people live together – in a specific locale or region or, more 
widely, the world – whether they like it or not.  
 
This plural, political process depends on the creation of public spaces for collective 
discussion and deliberation where citizens can test and expand their views, a public 
culture where people’s self-centred perspectives are constantly challenged – but not 
obliterated – by the multiplicity of perspectives which make up public life. This then 
requires the creation of institutions and practices (like those traditionally developed 
within adult education, including university-based adult education) where the 
perspectives of others, of diverse groups and communities can be articulated and 
expressed in their own right and in their own terms. Such a requirement ‘affirms the need 
for group-based organization and voice at the same time that it expresses openness to 
listening to others and engaging with them in shared public spaces’ (Young 2000: 225). 
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Arendt stresses the spatial quality of politics and public life: people must be able to see 
and talk to one another, to meet together in a public space so that both their differences 
and their commonalities can emerge, and so become subject to democratic debate. In this 
Arendt shares a metaphor with Liberalism (which continues to be the dominant 
perspective in Western societies). Both views draw on the metaphor of the public square 
which is contrasted with the private spaces of the houses where citizens live. Arendt 
describes this view very clearly: ‘The distinction between a private and a public sphere of 
life corresponds to the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct 
separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state.’ (Arendt 1958: 28). 
She also shares with Liberalism a view that a public space is one that is open to all who 
are able and willing to engage in rational argument. However there is an important 
difference. Arendt acknowledges real continuing differences and disagreements. 
Liberalism, on the other hand, depends on the triumph of the rational argument: ‘rational 
men will agree.’ It is a view that is still widespread. Annick Cojean articulates this liberal 
position when she writes, in an article bemoaning the obstacles being put in the way of a 
well-informed public debate in the UK and US concerning the build up to war with Iraq 
(such as systematic disinformation and the failure of politicians to get down to the 
grassroots to ask some simple questions): ‘One would be surprised to note that it is by 
exploring the differences that we find the most similarities’ (Cojean 2003). 
 
IV WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC SPACES 
 
In what follows, we consider how political-public space has been understood (a) in terms 
of the distinction between private and public and (b) in terms of the metaphor of the 
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public ‘forum’ or ‘sphere’. This is not only of theoretical interest. Our purpose is to use a 
critique of the current concepts of public space to construct a concept (or set of concepts) 
which would provide a framework which points up, rather than obscures, possibilities 
within Higher Education for the accommodation and reconstruction of ‘public 
knowledge’. We are particularly interested in the spaces in and around institutions of 
Higher Education where women, gays, Black people, migrants, working class people, 
Asian people - and any other of the many groups currently under-represented in the class 
of people creating, articulating and expressing knowledge.  
 
a)  The distinction between private and public 
 
The sharp distinction made between public and private space is central to the usual 
concepts of public space used in our societies. This remains true for currently influential 
versions of Liberalism including Rawls (1972), in the Anglo-American tradition, and 
Benhabib (1992), a feminist strongly influenced by Habermas.6 That it is a mistake to 
make this sharp distinction can be seen from reflection on everyday experiences of 
scholarship, teaching, learning and researching, in our own institutions of Higher 
Education. Such activities depend on there being a number of spaces where individuals 
meet to formulate and re-formulate their understanding of the world, and to devise, learn 
and practise their skills: in short to ‘produce’ knowledge in all the many senses of that 
word, related to gaining and expressing factual information, understanding, wisdom and 
                                                 
6 The public space is not necessarily a unitary space. For instance, Benhabib argues that Habermasian 
public space could be construed as plural. Since it is constructed by discourse, ‘in principle there can be as 
many publics as there are discourses concerning controversial norms’ (1992: 119). She gives the example 
of the ‘“public” sphere of the pornography debate’ as distinct from the ‘“public” sphere of the foreign 
policy debate’ (ibid). However the sharp distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ remains. 
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skills. Yet these spaces are not quite public: they are not equally open to all: neither are 
they quite private in the sense that they are open to individuals by virtue of what they are 
(e.g. students, chemists, deans), rather than who they are (e.g. Jean Barr, Morwenna 
Griffiths, Melanie Walker or Jon Nixon) (Arendt 1958).  
 
A familiar and helpful example of the complexity of the divisions between public and 
private spaces is to be found in the university department. A university department is a 
place of work, where people are to be found in virtue of their role there – though it is not 
co-terminous with its physical location [as Ryle (1971) remarked of Oxford University]. 
It can be described by contrast to the home, and is the ‘work’ part of the work/life 
balance. On the other hand, it is clear that some of the worry about that balance comes 
about precisely because one seeps into the other. Doreen Massey describes how in a 
context of competitive workaholism in current academic life women endlessly try to 
juggle incompatibilities between work and home demands, whilst men working in the 
‘High-Tech' industries she studied (and, by extension, she suggests, in the academy) 
spoke of ‘minds being elsewhere’ when playing with their children, but not vice versa, 
whilst at work (Massey 2001).  
 
Even when the department is viewed as a public place in relation to the home, it is at the 
same time, not so public in relation to the university as a whole, nor to various policy 
making bodies – in the UK the funding bodies and central government – nor to various 
local communities or institutions (e.g. in business, the arts, local government, schools, 
hospitals and the law). A department’s discussions about teaching or research are not 
open to the rest of the university, except in carefully worded reports or minutes. 
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Discussions are certainly not open to the general public. (Going to the Press is a serious 
matter, as is the content of websites.) Nor are they open to policy makers (Anecdotes 
abound about successful performance in front of inspecting bodies and how wool was 
pulled over eyes.)  
 
This complexity of public places in relation to the private is sometimes described as a set 
of concentric circles, of increasing openness as they become more public. But this is a 
false description. A university department is rarely the place to encounter educational 
policy makers and their discussions in the public space of coming to know what is 
happening in Higher Education. Ordinary members of university departments are rarely 
included, even as observers in discussions among educational policy makers. Ask any 
member of staff trying to discover what might be going on among the movers and shakers 
in the Ministry let alone trying to contribute to their knowledge about Higher Education.7  
 
b) Metaphor 
 
The distinction between private and public mirrors the metaphor used to describe the 
space in which public debates occur: the forum of ancient city-states as contrasted with 
the private houses of citizens. This narrowly physical conception of political-public space 
may have been adequate once but it has outlived its usefulness. It may well have been 
true that the (male, free) citizens of ancient times could congregate in a single space in 
                                                 
7 See Smith (2001) for an account of how he was offended by Dearing’s failure to understand what 
university teaching means to a university teacher: certainly not ‘facilitation’ or ‘delivery’. 
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which any of them could make their presence felt. However such spaces no longer exist, 
even for a single university.  
 
The boundaries defining a university are fluid, fuzzy and difficult to draw. At first sight it 
may appear that the staff and students of a university make up a small community 
roughly the size of many ancient city-states. But the community is not so self-contained. 
Those deeply interested in the teaching, learning, scholarship and research of any given 
university include all those who might benefit from it, or wish to do so. Consider again 
the local schools, hospitals, law firms and businesses. Consider all those people who visit 
from time to time (in person, through email, through the web) to visit the library, engage 
in dialogue or simply learn from its tutors and support staff. Consider all those 
institutions in partnership with the university, locally, nationally and internationally: they 
are in partnership precisely because of their interest in knowledge. In this context there is 
a very limited application for the metaphor of a universally accessible ‘forum’ or a 
‘sphere’, even in the attenuated form of, say, an academic council, or a university e-mail 
system. 
  
Why make such a fuss about a metaphor? As Maxine Greene says: 'A metaphor is what it 
does. A metaphor, because of the way it brings together things that are unlike, re-orients 
consciousness, which customarily connects things that are like’ (Greene and Griffiths 
2002: 85). We want to work with this idea that thinking metaphorically can reorient 
consciousness. At the same time we remain mindful that thinking with old, stiff, outworn 
metaphors can fix thinking in unhelpful directions. This raises the question as to how new 
metaphors might be invented, whether metaphors can be ‘timely’, and how and why some 
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metaphors come to be seen as illuminating or a hindrance. The feminist philosopher Jean 
Grimshaw, in an illuminating article on ‘Philosophy and the feminist imagination’ draws 
on the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1990) point out that much of our everyday language which we may 
think of as cut and dried and ‘literal’ is in fact metaphorically structured, in that one sort 
of thing is conceptualised in terms of another. Examples they discuss are ‘Argument is 
war’, ‘Time is money’, ‘Love is a journey’. Some can be seen as kinds of ‘root’ 
metaphors in the sense that they underlie a whole host of everyday ways of thinking. 
‘Argument is war’ is like this in that it underlies other terms such as ‘winning’, ‘strategy’, 
‘weak points’ and so on. These are metaphors we live by, according to Lakoff and 
Johnson, in that they provide us with open-ended ‘gestalts’ which organise and help 
construct our experience to such an extent that they have become ‘common sense’. By 
drawing attention to their root metaphor (‘Argument is war’) which we do not in fact use 
explicitly as a metaphor, such expressions are de-familiarised and we are thereby invited 
to reflect on how they affect the ways we think and the ways we behave (Grimshaw 
2000). 
 
Jean Grimshaw asks us to ‘re-metaphorise the familiar’, to see it as strange, by asking us 
to consider a new metaphor for the processes of discussion and argument, ‘Argument is 
horticulture’. We are to imagine ourselves faced with statements such as: 
 We need to water this argument. 
 This idea needs pruning. 
 We’d be clearer if we re-potted these thoughts. 
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 These ideas need putting into the sunlight. 
 This theory won’t be ripe until the autumn. 
 This book doesn’t have deep enough roots.   
Of course any ‘non-ordinary’ meanings and metaphors would have to catch on, and given 
the academic ‘cringe’ factor the horticultural one is unlikely to do so in our universities. 
Grimshaw acknowledges:  
Linguistic agency cannot be thought of as an abstract autonomy; our utterances 
are produced and sedimented by histories which we do not create, and have 
effects which we cannot ultimately determine, predict or control, and of which we 
may be unaware. But within this history and unwittingness, I believe there is a 
space for the conscious and intentional operation of feminist imagination, for 
experimental engagements with metaphors and styles and forms of discourse’ 
(Grimshaw 2000: 204-5). 
 
Feminists have been amongst those who are most interested in freeing up old patterns of 
thinking, behaving and relating. The project recommended here by Grimshaw, to 
investigate the role which metaphors might play in the ‘feminist imagination’ is 
suggestive for our project in this paper. For it helps point towards ‘loosening up’ thinking 
about the public sphere/public spaces in ways which may be more helpful and more 
‘timely’ than traditional, sedimented, ways.  
 
Following Jean Grimshaw’s suggestion, we present a new metaphor of public space, in 
the hope that will help in the task of freeing up ossified patterns of understanding the 
democratic possibilities of public space in universities. More exactly, it is less a new 
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metaphor, than an old one with a feminist makeover. We invite re-consideration of the 
metaphor of ‘the body politic’.  
 
In its more traditional forms, the body politic is one in which the head rules, while each 
of the members play their various parts. This is a metaphor of a bounded body ruled by 
hierarchies. The feminist philosopher, Donna Haraway, in a series of books and articles 
gives a richer – and a more startling – notion of the body. This is a notion of a body as 
network, as connected, as constructed both by discourse and by the materiality of new 
technologies. Haraway (1991) draws together two ideas governing biological discourse 
about bodies: the immune system and the cyborg. The immune system, she says, is 
understood:  
Not as a system of work, organized by the hierarchical division of labour, ordered 
by a privileged dialectic between highly localized nervous and reproductive 
functions, but instead as a coded text, organized as an engineered communications 
system, ordered by a fluid and dispersed command-control-intelligence network. 
(211) 
She goes on to explain that this discourse has: 'Destabilised the symbolic privilege of the 
hierarchical, localised, organic body.' She argues: 'Bodies have become cyborgs – 
cybernetic organisms – compounds of hybrid techno-organic embodiment and textuality. 
The cyborg is text, machine, body, and metaphor – all theorized and engaged in terms of 
communication.' (Haraway 1991: 212). Similarly, Christine Battersby (1998) criticises 
traditional philosophers conceptions of the body as she rather draws our attention to 
bodies that bleed; to leaky bodies that have no fixed or impermeable boundary; to bodies 
that are fluid and changing rather than fixed and immutable.  
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 These metaphors provide us with a rich set of possibilities for understanding the public 
spaces in the networks that go beyond any traditional bounds of universities. They point 
to the leaky bodies politic that constitute our familiar world of Institutions of Higher 
Education. They make it easier for us to discern some of the spaces in and around 
universities where public knowledge is alive and well. They allow us to re-think the 
spaces where knowledge can travel both ways through various forms of dialogue and 
expression. 
 
The first example comes from North America. Ross Gray works at the University of 
Toronto and is also the co-director of a cancer centre. He works closely with groups of 
patients, drawing out from them their fears and understandings of their health problems. 
He is careful, as he describes, to work with them, not on them as would happen with 
classical research subjects. This then opens the way to carrying out a collective 
exploration of ways of expressing what they have (collectively) learnt in drama – which 
is used for health education more widely in North America. The research-based drama 
about breast cancer, Handle with Care? was performed across Canada about 200 times. 
He is now working with a new drama on prostate cancer, No Big Deal. (See Gray and 
Sinding 2002; Gray 2003). One of us (Morwenna) heard about this project at an academic 
conference in Canada. Getting knowledge from conference presentations is academic life 
as normal. But consider: this is knowledge gained from drawing on spaces far beyond the 
traditional, which has now been incorporated into the academy. At the same conference 
another academic described how her approach to her research had been transformed by 
coming across Gray’s work. Meanwhile, once back in England, Morwenna emailed one 
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of her research students (who lived in another town and lectured at a different university) 
to tell him about it. He ordered the books for his own library – and for all she knows they 
are still in email contact across the Atlantic. A public space, a web of relations has been 
created; it is a space of a cyborg body politic, dependent for its creation and maintenance 
on both face-to-face contact and on the technologies of phone, email, word-processing - 
even mass air travel.  
 
Cynthia Cockburn, a University based sociologist also shifts productively between the 
university and the knowledge to be found beyond its formal boundaries. She used her 
university position and knowledge to fund a project, part-research, part-development, 
part-activist, in which she worked with women in Bosnia, Belfast and Israel-Palestine. 
Earlier in the article we quoted her explaining that these are places where differences of 
identity may be lethal. The groups she worked with operate as collectives across the 
boundaries of such identities. Cockburn learnt from and contributed to these groups 
(Cockburn 1998; Cockburn and Hunter 1999). The collaboration was more than a rational 
and verbal exchange of views - though it included many verbal and rational exchanges of 
views. The project included producing an exhibition of photographs, and visits by the 
women to observe and to live closely with women from the other countries for short 
periods of time. The exhibition was intended to be of use to the activist communities who 
might support the various projects. At the same time knowledge collectively made across 
the academic/activist boundary has been used to inform academic projects. For example 
it has informed this one: we cited this work earlier in this article. It reached our attention 
through a mix of cross-university cyber links, of face-to-face conferences and seminars, 
and through traditionally printed books and desk-top published material. As with the 
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previous example a cyborg body politic has been created in this web of relations. It 
depends on technologies for its existence.  
 
A final example comes from knowledge gained, developed and expressed as part of doing 
a Ph.D. Jean Rath’s doctorate (Rath 1999) evaluated a course which trained rape 
counsellors. This was not an evaluation in which the university based worker tried to take 
an external objective stance. It was not just that as a rape counsellor herself, she was an 
outsider-insider. A major part of the project of creating the thesis was taken up with her 
exploration of ways she could find to working with rape counsellors to express what it 
means to do the job. For instance, rather than present their words as short quotations as is 
usual in qualitative evaluation, she turned their words into poetry (keeping the words and 
the order, and working closely with the women). These powerful evocations of 
experience were then part of the academic knowledge she could use, did use, in academic 
settings: papers, seminars. Other aspects of this academic knowledge included highly 
theoretical discussion of the limits of knowledge and its expression. But the poems also 
entered the space of the rape counsellors and the rape counselling training, and had a 
separate life and purpose there. In short this doctoral thesis uses the public space of 
esoteric post-modern theory, while it intersects with the public space of rape counselling 
centres, to construct knowledge for both, drawing on both, differently expressed in each 
space, but unorthodox in both. Again, as with the previous examples, this network of 
relations would not have been possible without a range of technologies. Indeed the thesis 
as a whole is best read in its electronic versions.  
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In this article we have stressed plurality and imagination in thinking about the role of 
universities as producers, purveyors and guardians of what we have called ‘public 
knowledge’. We have stressed the involvement of many publics and many forms of 
engagement in re-thinking (re-imagining) notions of public space which have held sway 
until now. It is our belief that traditional meanings and sedimented metaphors restrict and 
contain and that the time is ripe for new thinking which will open up rather than close 
down possibilities for the creative development of new understandings of the world (as 
well as practical solutions to urgent problems). Our argument is that academics cannot do 
this on their own but have to learn to engage with communities, individuals and groups 
outside the academy. Specifically, we have suggested that the requirement is for higher 
education practices in which the perspectives and insights of diverse groups and 
communities can be treated in their own terms and where the knowledge developed is not 
just about information or even ‘critical intelligence’ but is about our sense of ourselves 
and the world, and, a much neglected aspect of epistemology, knowing people.  
 
In the current context, the danger we face of a privatized university system is not a distant 
possibility, given the prominence of market criteria in higher education as in the wider 
society. Faced with this, a new, committed approach to higher education is urgently 
required, one which reaches out in dialogue and partnership with its wider community 
(local and international) and which, in resisting the equation of ‘community’ with 
‘business community’, acknowledges that we live in a deeply troubled world. In such a 
world, the possibility of engaging the university with the whole community, bringing to 
bear rigorous intellectual enquiry and creative imagination into the whole range of areas 
of importance to humankind is surely vital.   
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Nicholas Maxwell gets it right when he writes in a letter to the Guardian (25/3/03 p. 23): 
Academia as it exists at present … betrays both reason and humanity. The proper 
rational task of academia is to help humanity learn how to tackle its conflicts and 
problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways than at present. A rational 
and responsible academia would act as a kind of people’s civil service doing 
openly for the public what actual civil services are suppose to do in secret for 
governments.  
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